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Introduction

It is undoubtedly clear that the foundation of the Islamic finance industry…is still weak…
further supports this by arguing that financial intermediaries have the capacity to render the economy vulnerable to risk, as they connect asset prices with the macro economy. 3 The purpose of this article is to critically examine a wide array of traditional Islamic debt instruments in the context of their economic efficiency and permissibility in Islam. This issue is of utmost importance, especially if we accept the view of Timur Kuran -that the 1of this issue is still being observed in the current tragedies of the migrants, who risk their very lives to reach the shores of the developed nations (of the West) to live in dignity. 5 There is, therefore, an urgency to revitalise financial intermediation in Muslim economies by adopting efficient financial facilities acceptable in the spirit of the Sharī c a, to stem centuries of economic decline. 6 This necessitates a critical overview of the traditional financial instruments as described below. The employment of the traditional commercial debt instruments is generally justified by Sharī c a-scholars based on the fact that they were utilised in the era of the Prophet and that of the first generation of Muslim, known in Islamic lore as the Pious Predecessors (al-Salaf al-ṣāliḥ). There is nothing sacrosanct about these instruments per se as they were a feature of the economic landscape of Arabia long before
Islam. The Qurʹān and the Sunna (the normative practice of Prophet Muhammad) prohibit only those financial arrangements that are potentially inequitable and capable of creating dissonance in society -those which fall out with this category are permitted. In the modern era, it is imperative that we employ efficient non-usurious (ghayr ribawī) facilities to enhance the financial intermediation system and revive economic growth in the Muslim world.
Plain Vanilla Interest Bearing (Ribāwī) Debt Securities
This vehicle is explicitly forbidden in Islam. 7 In the contemporary stage of financial development, the first issue, i.e. expropriation, may not be of concern to credit-worthy customers. However, it is of concern to less creditworthy ones, imposing an extraordinary amount of cost of financing, eventually leading to their financial exclusion. The second issue, i.e. fragility, is a serious concern for all economic agents, as observed in the recent financial crisis. It continues to be a problematic issue in all traditional Islamic financial instruments and is resolved only in contemporary hybrid ones.
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In this regard, Ebrahim and Hussain contrast plain vanilla debt with a family of synthetic (structured) debt (termed as Participating Mortgages -PMs), both collateralized by real assets. 13 They demonstrate that ribawī debt is at the lowest rung of economic efficiency ˗ that is, the most inefficient vehicle. This resonates with the view of Gerschenkron that, the prominence of banks in economic development stems from economic backwardness. 14 The rationale behind the inefficiency of ribawī debt stems from its inability to address the above three issues, along with three more issues described below. 
The Classic Murābaḥa and its Derivatives
The classic or the historic murābaḥa involves a simple sales transaction based on credit, whereby the seller declares his cost and profit. Murābaḥa sales are described in the well-known book of Prophetic traditions (ḥadith), the Muwaṭṭa of Mālik ibn Anas (d. 795 CE). The jurists (fuqahā') generally permit the credit sale of goods, which are classified as ghayr-ribawī (i.e., non-usurious). They rationalise this using the Qur'ānic verse: "God has permitted trade (implying credit sales) and forbidden ribā (implying usury)". 21, 22 Financial economists, however, rationalise the permissibility of credit sales (in the Qurʹān and Sunna)
to the absence of financial markets in the era of the Prophet (PBUH) and the Pious
Predecessors. This is due to the fact that "when financial markets are imperfect, a seller can find it optimal to offer a menu of deferred payment plans".
23
The banking murābaḥa, in contrast to the classic one, is used as a financing tool instead of extending credit by a merchant to enhance the demand for his goods. This facility along with its derivative (called tawarruq, structured using a banking murābaḥa in conjunction with a simultaneous sale of the real asset purchased through it) can be critiqued as stratagems to bypass the injunction of ribā. 24 This is because they are employed purely in the financial sector of the economy.
The classic murābaḥa is priced employing the price elasticity of demand of the good being sold in conjunction with the expected rate of return of the merchant. 25 In contrast, the banking murābaḥa along with tawarruq are priced primarily using a ribawī index due to the global integration of capital markets. This implies that, in the contemporary era, the banking murābaḥa and tawarruq are not free from the "vapours of ribā."
Comparing the attributes of ribawī debt to that of murābaḥa, we realize the following:
First, murābaḥa reduces adverse selection, as the "seller" of goods is aware of exactly where his resources are expended.
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Second, murābaḥa reduces the agency cost of debt as it is collateralized.
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Third, tawarruq is akin to a non-collateralized ribawī loan. It therefore suffers from adverse selection as well as high agency cost of debt. This results in a high cost of funding, and therefore yields low debt capacity. It is construed as a stratagem to thwart the spirit of Fourth, for credit worthy customers, both classic as well as banking murābaḥa will not be onerous. That is, in general, it will not extricate wealth of either party to the contract.
However, it will be onerous to the less credit worthy customers, eventually leading to their financial exclusion.
Fifth, a banking murābaḥa will be more expensive than a ribawī debt contract due to reduced economies of scale and the incremental expenses of documenting the subterfuge, i.e.,
paying Sharī c a scholars for their approval, etc. Currently, penalties are also imposed on late payments to alleviate moral hazard in violation of the Qur'ānic verse, which asks lenders to give respite to borrowers. 29 This leads one to question the efficiency of these vehicles.
Sixth, both murābaḥa facilities (along with tawarruq) are fragile ones even though the Sunna (in case of the two murabaha facilities) allows the "seller" of goods (i.e., lender) to retrieve his goods (i.e., the underlying collateral) upon the bankruptcy of the "buyer" of goods (i.e., borrower). Nonetheless, the classic murābaḥa still serves an economic purpose. That is, it expands the demand for goods in the real sector of the economy for credit worthy clients. For the less credit worthy ones, efforts must be made to incorporate charitable funds (in the Islamic financial intermediation system) to alleviate their burden. This is illustrated in our discussion of Qard Ḥasan (Gratuitous Loan) in Section 5 given below.
Seventh
4.
Ijāra (Leasing)
Leasing or renting an asset is a useful tool for people or businesses who do not wish to expend cash at the onset of a project, or acquisition, and which is preferable to ribā based financing. 32 It is applied to computers, telecommunications equipment, office equipment, rail cars, trucks and aviation, and even for home acquisition in the 'lease to own' contract. It generally makes economic sense to lease depreciating assets and own appreciating assets.
The ideal Islamic lease is similar to a closed end or operating lease in the US, in which the lessor owns title to the asset and the lessee has the right to use the asset for a specific period. The lease payments depend upon the type of asset, the lease period, the residual value of the asset, the tax regime, the expected rate of return, and the incorporation of various real options in the indenture of the contract.
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The main difference between an Islamic lease and a ribawī lease is that the lease payments are evaluated using an expected rate of return. The realized returns could be different depending upon the use or abuse of the asset by the lessee, and the market conditions for the disposal of the asset at the end of the lease term. These risks are borne by the lessor.
Leasing is a highly competitive business. Islamic banks not only must compete with mainstream (i.e., ribawī) banks, but also with manufacturers who entice buyers with low lease payments in order to increase sales during recessions. With most mainstream institutions, the true costs of leasing are often higher than the payments, as the lessee may be required to assume 100% of the residual market risks, and the lessor's acquisition costs at the term of the lease. These risks transfers in the west are not always well defined in lease contracts, and ensure high returns on the capital of leasing companies.
Contrasting the attributes of ribāwi debt with that of ijāra, we realize the following:
First, for credit worthy customers, the ijāra payments will not be onerous. That is, in general, it will not extricate wealth of either party to the leasing contract. However, it will be onerous to the less credit worthy customers leading to their financial exclusion.
Second, ijāra facilities are fragile even though the Sunna allows the lessor to repossess the leased asset on default of the contract.
Third, leasing can be onerous to the less credit worthy customers eventually leading to their financial exclusion.
Comparing ijāra with secured "Islamic" debt (such as banking murābaḥa) we realize the following: One, ijāra is a substitute for debt financing.
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Two, it involves stronger claims than secured lending.
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This is attributed to the alleviation of asymmetric information and the ease of repossession of leased asset on default.
This results in lower cost of funding and thus more debt capacity.
Three, ijāra is subject to monitoring costs, which in the case of some durable goods (such as automobiles) can be trivial 36 and can be more expensive in others.
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In conclusion, we rank the traditional commercial "Islamic" debt instruments of murābaḥa, tawarruq and ijāra as follows. Ijāra is slightly more efficient than murābaḥa, followed by tawarruq. Nonetheless, in the nomenclature of Ebrahim and Hussain, these vehicles would still be classified at the lowest rung of economic efficiency. 38 From the perspective of the Sharī c a, they still do not give respite to the users of funds and thus convey fragility to the economic system. 39 The only way to reduce (but not completely eliminate) this fragility is to price the facilities meticulously with an optimal loan to value and tenure, so that the Put option to default is never in the money. This is illustrated in Ebrahim. 40 
Qard Ḥasan (Gratuitous Loan):
The intuition behind the employment of this stems from the Qurʹān, which exhorts
Muslims to lend without interest, classifying it as a loan to God Himself. 41 This is reinforced in the ḥadīth of the Prophet Muhammad, which ranks interest free loans higher than voluntary charity (sadaqa). 42 The shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya emphasised the contrast made in the Qur'ānic verse between charity and ribā. 43 The inference drawn from the verse is as follows: ribā alienates the segments (or classes) of society (due to its potential to expropriate assets as stated earlier), while charity unifies them. Government using this interest free facility in conjunction with paying an extraneous amount out of one's free will (e.g. as gifts -hiba) allowed in the Sunna. 49 The difficulty behind the integration of charitable funds in the Islamic financial intermediation stems from the following.
a. Adverse Selection: How will the funds disbursed through this facility be expended?
This is a crucial issue, as ex-ante controls are needed to ensure that funds are expended for the purpose requested. In Ebrahim, a qarḍ ḥasan mortgage is issued only at the time of escrow when the title of the specific property is exchanged for cash. Thus, the dire economic state of the Muslim world necessitates the precise structure of financial cooperatives employing qarḍ ḥasan to allay poverty.
Conclusions:
There is nothing sacrosanct about the traditional Islamic debt facilities of murābaḥa and ijāra per se except that they were employed in the era of the Prophet and that of the Pious Predecessors. 57 The exception is that of qarḍ ḥasan which is recommended in the Sharī c a. The first two facilities are still endowed with the potential to: (i) expropriate the assets of the counterparty to the contract; (ii) convey fragility to the financial system; and (iii) exclude the underprivileged from financial services. In contrast, the last facility also suffers 53 See Ebrahim, Supra note 40, for a description of a mathematical model (i.e., an algorithm) to reduce the risk of default.
54 Ibid.
55 Supra note 1, 24. The classic murābaḥa, banking murābaḥa and ijāra reduce adverse selection and need monitoring mechanisms to be set in place to reduce moral hazard. In contrast, tawarruq needs mechanisms to control for both adverse selection and moral hazard.
In terms of economic efficiency, we would rank ijāra over both forms of murābaḥa and tawarruq. Qarḍ ḥasan needs to be incorporated in the Islamic financial intermediation system to alleviate financial exclusion. It should be preferred over the controversial tawarruq facility. However, it should be structured meticulously via financial cooperatives to mitigate adverse selection, moral hazard and risk shifting. The efficiency of the traditional debt facilities of murābaḥa and ijāra, however, pales over that of the modern hybrid facilities discussed in Ebrahim, Salleh and Sheikh. 59 This is because hybrid facilities are in the rung above the traditional Islamic debt facilities from the perspective of Ebrahim and Hussain as they resolve the agency cost of debt better than the traditional commercial facilities. 60 They also alleviate the issue of fragility, as they are capable of bestowing respite to borrowers in poor states of economy in accordance with the Qurʹānic guidance. 58 Supra note 24.
59 Supra note 12.
60 Supra note 13.
61 Q2: 280.
